Every year Iraqis hear that their country’s sovereignty is a red line. The speeches are always good. Then you read what has been reported since this summer, and the red line starts to look more like a suggestion. According to a run of reports published between July and October 2026, a Yemeni armed group has set up offices, supply routes and a drone operation on Iraqi soil, under the protection of Iraqi factions that belong to the state’s own security forces, and has helped attack a neighboring country from there.
Sovereignty Day, and a video that asked the obvious question
Iraq spent September 30 to October 4 celebrating what it called Sovereignty Day, marking the end of the U.S.-led coalition’s mission and the withdrawal of its forces. Writing in Annahar on October 1, the commentator Ehsan al-Shammari pointed out some of the contradictions: the factions that cheered the withdrawal as a victory over America are the same ones that reject the government’s constitutional authority to dismantle parallel weapons. On September 30, the outlet Shabakat al-Saa reported that a video had appeared showing an Iranian flag being raised during Sovereignty Day celebrations in central Baghdad. It did not say who raised it.
A short video by Ali Fadhil, speaking in Iraqi Arabic, starts from exactly that scene. He says there is reliable information that between 500 and 600 Houthis entered Iraq two days earlier. He then reads out a list of names, Abu Idris al-Sharafi, Abu Ali al-Ezzi, Abu Taha al-Washli, Fadl al-Sharafi, Mohammed Abdul-Azim al-Houthi, Abu Hussein al-Houthi, Kamal al-Houthi, Shadhi al-Hasani, Abdulghani Khanjar, Muaz al-Junaid, Ahmed Abdulmalik and Abdulmalik Murtadha, known as Abu Talib, who he says represented the Houthis in Syria and moved to Iraq after Bashar al-Assad fell. Their presence, he says, is coordinated with Lebanese Hezbollah and based at Jurf al-Sakhar, where he says there is a Houthi base under direct Iranian supervision.
Then he asks the questions. Whose interest is it for Baghdad to host Houthi leaders while the Houthis are at war with Saudi Arabia? Is stirring up hostility with Arab states good for Iraq? Why is Iran turning Iraq into a base for striking its neighbors? He says that when the militias hit neighboring countries like Jordan or the Gulf states, the government’s statement is timid and does not even call them terrorists, which would at least protect Iraq’s diplomatic relations. And if Iran has its own problems, he says, why should Iraq be hijacked by militias that are against the state in the first place? What do the Houthis offer Iraq? Their leaders, he says, come and go and keep military headquarters in Jurf al-Sakhar and elsewhere under the militias’ protection. “Where is the government? Where is the sovereignty?” And then, he says, along comes one of their followers to celebrate Sovereignty Day holding an Iranian flag, while a Tishreen protester carrying an Iraqi flag is told he is an agent.
The rest of this article puts his questions to the record.
It started with an office in Jadriyah
None of this began in 2026. In February 2025, Sary Mumayiz, Michael Knights and Hamdi Malik of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy wrote that the Houthis first started building a presence in Iraq in 2011, “in a subtle way.” In 2016 they sent a delegation openly, and the prime minister at the time, Haider al-Abadi, recognized it as a “representative of Yemen.” In June 2024 Houthi officials quietly opened an office in Baghdad’s Jadriyah neighborhood, near the International Zone, run by Ahmed al-Sharafi, who goes by Abu Idris.
A month later, on July 30, 2024, a senior Houthi drone specialist was killed at Jurf al-Sakhar while working alongside Iranian and Iraqi personnel. Jurf al-Sakhar sits in Babil province, south of Baghdad. It is run by Kataib Hezbollah, which the United States calls a terrorist organization and which is part of the Popular Mobilization Forces, the force that Iraq’s government pays. Iraqi militias had stopped attacking Israel that November after statements by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, but the Washington Institute authors warned against assuming that meant “the end of Houthi basing at facilities belonging to the Iraqi government and designated Iraqi terrorist groups.”
Put plainly: a foreign armed movement opened an office in the capital, and one of its drone experts died in a base run by an Iraqi faction on the government payroll.
From an office to an operations room
By 2026, according to the reporting, it had become something bigger. On July 29, Asharq Al-Awsat wrote that Houthi ties with Iraqi factions had grown from political and media coordination into a working partnership covering military, logistical and intelligence work, and that the Houthi mission had left its public offices in Baghdad for safer ground, mainly in Babil. It named five Houthi figures who handle the Iraq file, including Abu Idris al-Sharafi as head of the mission, Abu Ali al-Ezzi as a drone expert and Fadl al-Sharafi as the money man, though everything in it is credited to unnamed sources.
Al-Hurra, citing Iraqi intelligence sources on October 2, went further. It said the Houthis had opened religious, social and business offices in Baghdad, Karbala, Najaf, Maysan, Muthanna, Wasit, Babil and Diyala, and that a Revolutionary Guard official known as Haji Hamed oversees part of the activity.
The AP reported on September 9 that the Houthis helped Iraqi militias plan and carry out a two-day swarm of drone attacks on Saudi oil facilities in July, while two PMF officials denied involvement and said the Houthis do not work under the PMF’s umbrella. And on July 30 the Yemeni outlet Yemen Online reported that Houthi officials had announced the death of a senior figure, Mohammed Khaled al-Ayashi, in raids on PMF positions in Iraq, along with four Revolutionary Guard advisers whose bodies were sent back to Tehran. The same report says Houthi specialists have been operating drones and missiles from Iraqi territory since February 2026. If that is right, a Yemeni movement and the Revolutionary Guard were using Iraqi land for months while Baghdad kept issuing statements that its territory would not be used to attack anyone.
The names that keep coming up
Reports on this network name a fair number of people, and the spellings change from outlet to outlet. Here is who appears, and who reported it.
On the Houthi side, the central figure in nearly every account is Ahmed al-Sharafi, known as Abu Idris. The Washington Institute says he was put in charge of joint security operations between the Houthis and Iran-backed Iraqi militias, and that he visited militia offices accompanied by PMF leaders. The Middle East Forum, citing Reuters, says he leads the network and was involved in the Houthis’ military manufacturing program before he came to Iraq. The same institute lists Mohammed al-Qabli as the Houthis’ formal ambassador to Iraq as of early 2025, saying he met militia leaders regularly in Baghdad and led demonstrations in Tahrir Square demanding the expulsion of U.S. forces.
Under him, according to the Middle East Forum, are Abu Ali al-Izzi, described as deputy head of the mission, who operated in Babil and the Musayyib area and worked as a lecturer at an Iraqi university; Mohammed Abdul-Azim al-Houthi, who oversees religious and ideological activity; Fadl al-Sharafi, who manages part of the money and set up a charitable foundation in Najaf; and Abdulmalik Murtadha, known as Abu Talib, who previously represented the Houthis in Syria under Bashar al-Assad. Asharq Al-Awsat adds a fifth, Abu Hiba, as the intelligence and security official. Two names belong to the dead: Hussein Abdullah Mastour al-Shibl, known as Abu Jihad, a drone expert killed in July 2024, and Mohammed Khaled al-Ayashi, whose death the Houthis announced in July 2026.
The same names are circulating in Arabic reporting. On August 1, Sada al-Sahel relayed a post on X by the Iraqi data journalist Othman al-Mukhtar listing Houthi leaders he says are present in Iraq. It includes Abu Taha al-Washli, described as the group’s coordination official in Iraq, and Abu Hiba, given the real name Majid al-Barraq and described as its security official. It also lists Abu Hussein al-Houthi, Kamal al-Houthi, Shadhi al-Hasani, Abdulghani Khanjar, Muaz al-Junaid and Ahmed Abdulmalik without saying what they do. It says Fadl al-Sharafi founded the Citizen Charitable Foundation in Najaf, and Abdulmalik Murtadha was the Houthi representative to the Syrian regime.
On the Iranian side, Al-Hurra’s sources name a Revolutionary Guard official called Haji Hamed as the man who oversees part of the activity, and the Washington Institute says Quds Force general Reza Shahlai brought his deep Houthi ties to the Iraq file in 2023 and 2024.
On the Iraqi side, the Middle East Forum says Ahmed Mohsen al-Hamidawi, the head of Kataib Hezbollah, provides the Houthis with political, military and logistical cover. The Washington Institute says Asaib Ahl al-Haq leader Qais al-Khazali meets Abu Idris regularly, and that Faleh al-Fayyad, a PMF leader the United States has designated as a human rights abuser, attended a June 2024 film screening where Houthi officials were present. Al-Hurra quotes former foreign minister Hoshyar Zebari saying the Houthis had a hand in the attack on the East-West pipeline in Saudi Arabia, and security expert Saif Raad arguing that the Houthis “are not merely advisers” but take part in operations from Iraqi territory. Then there are the officials who have to answer for it: Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, government spokesman Haidar al-Aboudi, and Hadi al-Amiri of Badr, who told fighters to bite the wound.
Who paid for it
Saudi Arabia and the United States answered. On July 29 they carried out joint strikes on Iran-backed militia positions in Iraq, after attacks on Saudi energy sites that included the Aramco refinery in Jizan on July 25. The PMF said at least 20 of its members were killed and 32 wounded. According to The National, Riyadh and Washington said the strikes were a response to attacks on the kingdom launched from Iraqi territory, and Riyadh said it did not want escalation but would answer any aggression. I find it hard to argue that a country has no right to hit the people firing at it.
What interests me more is how Baghdad reacted. The Iraqi presidency said it “categorically rejected” any attacks on Iraqi territory, while also opposing the use of Iraqi territory as a launching point or battleground against neighboring countries. That sentence objects to the strike and to its cause in one breath, and does nothing about either.
Then the Islamic Resistance in Iraq gave the government a deadline: take action against Saudi Arabia, or it would respond itself. When the deadline ran out on August 7, The National reported that Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi raised the security level and put all military forces on alert, while Badr leader Hadi al-Amiri urged fighters to “postpone any reaction to the American-Saudi aggression and to bite the wound.” So armed groups, many of whose fighters draw state salaries through the Popular Mobilization Commission, handed their own government an ultimatum, and the government’s response was to put its army on alert.
A deadline that kept moving
The government’s answer to all of this was a disarmament timetable. On June 29, spokesman Haidar al-Aboudi announced that “all weapons outside the state framework will be subject to legal redress” after September 30, the date the U.S.-led coalition’s presence was due to end. By September 29, The National reported, Mr. al-Zaidi had reviewed that date and said the government now aimed to finish disarmament by June 2027. Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Imam Ali say they have already put their weapons under state authority. The hardliners, mainly Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba, say they will not disarm until foreign troops leave. Kataib Hezbollah is the group that controls Jurf al-Sakhar, where the reporting places the Houthi base.
Then, on September 30, the day the original deadline was supposed to arrive, the cabinet voted for a bill that would make the Popular Mobilization Forces a permanent national security institution, on equal footing with the army and with better benefits for its members. The National reported that it now goes to parliament. The United States has said the measure “undermines Iraq’s sovereignty and entrenches Iranian influence,” and an Iraqi official who wasn’t named warned that it would tighten Iran’s grip on the country. A few months after promising to bring weapons under state control, the government moved to make permanent the institution that shelters the groups it promised to disarm.
This is an old story. Mr. al-Zaidi was picked by the same Coordination Framework parties whose factions he is asking to disarm, and he is asking them to give up the weapons that keep those parties relevant. Iraqis have been hearing promises of state control over armed groups since the PMF was legalized in 2016. The Gulf states, meanwhile, have said openly that they hold Baghdad responsible for attacks launched from its soil.
So whose sovereignty is it?
Sovereignty is not a word you print at the top of a statement. It means the state decides who carries weapons, who opens an office, who fires from its fields and whose foreign advisers work on its land. Measured that way, the reporting describes an Iraq where a Yemeni movement and the Revolutionary Guard operate from the base of a faction that sits inside a state security body. As far as I could find, the government has not publicly acknowledged the Houthi offices, ordered them closed or expelled a single Houthi representative. What it has done is warn, extend deadlines and hold emergency meetings. That is how a government behaves when it doesn’t control its armed forces, or when it does and would rather not use them.
Neither explanation flatters the state. Saudi jets did not take Iraq’s sovereignty. They arrived after the attacks. It was given up slowly, by the people who talked about it loudest.
Sources:
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Sary Mumayiz, Michael Knights and Hamdi Malik, “Update on Houthi Involvement in Iraq” (Feb. 26, 2025); Asharq Al-Awsat, “Houthi Ties with Iraqi Factions Deepen into Operational Alliance” (July 29, 2026); Al-Hurra, “Exclusive: Houthis Embedded with Iran-Backed Militias Across Iraq, Intelligence Sources Say” (Oct. 2, 2026); Associated Press via Kurdistan24, “AP: Secret Houthi-Iraqi Militia Pipeline for Operations Against Saudi Arabia Revealed” (Sept. 9, 2026); Yemen Online, “Houthis Admit Commander Killed in Iraq Strikes Alongside IRGC Advisors” (July 30, 2026); Al Jazeera, “Iraqi armed groups condemn ‘dangerous escalation’ after US-Saudi strikes” (July 29, 2026); The National, “Tanks on the streets: Iraqi forces on high alert as militia deadline expires” (Aug. 7, 2026); The National, “Iraq prepares for new chapter after US troop withdrawal as security concerns remain” (Sept. 29, 2026); The National, “Fears raised by critics as Iraqi government approves controversial PMF law” (Sept. 30, 2026); Middle East Forum, Ali Mahmoud, “Inside the Houthi Network in Iraq” (Aug. 4, 2026); Shabakat al-Saa, report on the Iranian flag at Sovereignty Day celebrations in Baghdad (Sept. 30, 2026); Annahar, Ehsan al-Shammari, “Iraq… the paradoxes of Sovereignty Day” (Oct. 1, 2026); Sada al-Sahel, report on Othman al-Mukhtar’s list of Houthi leaders in Iraq (Aug. 1, 2026); the Short by Ali Fadhil on YouTube (transcript); Al Arabiya, “Iraq sets September 30 deadline for pro-Iran militias to disarm” (June 29, 2026); Al-Hurra, “Who Holds the Keys to Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces?” (on the 2016 PMF law and state salaries).