The emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant foreshadowed the rise of another non-state armed group that has become deeply involved in Iraq’s political and economic landscape. Following the approval of the fatwa by the Iranian Najaf religious authority, the Iraqi government called for militia mobilization as it struggled to combat ISIS with its weak and corrupt security forces. This led to the formation of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella organization consisting of fifty militias with varying ideologies and leadership styles. Estimates on the number of PMF fighters differ, but their sheer size is undeniably impressive. At the beginning of the battle to liberate Iraqi territory from ISIL, it was believed that there were as many as 250,000 PMF fighters. Initially praised for their bravery in driving out ISIS, many factions of the PMF, especially those with ties to Iran, have tarnished the organization’s reputation with corrupt practices and violence against Iraqis. Consequently, the PMF is now more widely recognized for its corruption and repression. In the ongoing political deadlock in Iraq, the Fatah Coalition and its affiliated PMF militias are hindering any attempts to reform the political system, fearing that such changes would threaten their own interests.
Following the ISIL takeover of Iraq in 2014, the Iraqi army collapsed, allowing ISIL forces to capture significant territories. To counter this threat, the PMF was established, primarily composed of Shia volunteers. Despite gaining popularity for their successes against ISIL, the PMF has been implicated in numerous human rights abuses. Reports from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have documented the PMF’s involvement in illegal prisons, abductions, torture, and extrajudicial killings. Specifically, Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, an Iranian-backed Shia militia operating under the PMF, has been linked to the deaths of over a hundred Sunni males. Additionally, Shia militias affiliated with the PMF have been accused of kidnappings and murders in various Iraqi cities. The PMF’s actions have raised serious concerns about the protection of human rights in Iraq.
Despite concerns about the PMF’s affiliations and involvement in politics, its popularity among Iraq’s Shia population remained strong. In a 2015 survey, 99 percent of Iraq’s Shia population expressed support for the PMF’s efforts against ISIL. Despite former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s calls for a clear separation between political and armed groups, the PMF’s popularity ultimately led to its participation in the 2018 parliamentary elections. The pro-Iran factions within the PMF united under the Fatah Coalition, which won 48 seats in Iraq’s parliament, giving them significant influence in the government formation process.
Although PMF are formally under the command of the armed forces, they have successfully retained their autonomy. This independence has enabled the PMF to engage in extensive economic activities without government supervision. For instance, the PMF has set up numerous checkpoints across Iraq, where they collect revenue. In Jalawla alone, these checkpoints are said to generate approximately $300,000 daily.
Groups within the PMF, such as the Badr Brigade and Asaib Ahl al-Haq, charge truck drivers anywhere from $100 to $500 per truck to pass through their checkpoints. To further maximize profits, the PMF has implemented a system at some checkpoints that allows cars to bypass the line of trucks for an extra $20 fee. As a result of these tactics, what used to be a five-hour journey between Baghdad and northern Iraq can now take up to seven days, with trucks lining up for miles due to the sheer number of checkpoints along the way.
Additionally, the PMF has unlawfully taken control of frontier crossings. In 2021, the Iraqi finance minister reported that the government should be earning $7 billion annually from customs revenue. However, due to a network of corrupt militias, merchants, and political parties, the Finance Ministry receives only 10 to 12 percent of this amount. Furthermore, the PMF has seized control of 72 oil fields in a region south of Mosul, previously held by ISIL. Large restaurants are being extorted for up to $3,000 per month as “protection money” by PMF factions. Failure to comply with these demands risks the destruction of their businesses.
In 2019, Iraqi frustration reached a boiling point, especially in Shia-majority areas where the PMF was influential, due to the government’s political incompetence and rampant corruption. Protesters targeted not only government buildings but also PMF offices, holding the PMF accountable for worsening living conditions. This shift in perception transformed the PMF from being seen as a protector to a repressive force. The unrest led to the formation of a crisis cell composed of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and various Iraqi PMF militias. Official statistics report that 165 demonstrators were killed and 6,100 injured, though some estimates suggest the death toll was as high as 400. Despite clear evidence that prominent protesters or outspoken critics were being targeted, Iraqi security forces failed to prevent these attacks. The PMF’s readiness to use violence to protect its political influence and economic benefits became evident. Consequently, due to ongoing corruption, graft accusations, and escalating violence against demonstrators, the PMF lost public support. In the October 2021 parliamentary elections, the Fatah Coalition, which includes the PMF, secured only 17 seats.
In 2022, signs of discord among Shiite factions began to emerge under the pretext of combating corruption. The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and the Fatah Alliance strongly opposed Muqtada al-Sadr’s reform agenda, fearing it would marginalize or even dismantle the PMF. Ironically, all Shiite parties are implicated in Iraq’s corruption and devastation. The West finds it particularly ironic that Muqtada al-Sadr, who has long envied the heads of corruption and from whom many of these militias originated, is now the one calling for reform. While Muqtada al-Sadr sought to overthrow the Fatah Alliance and its supporters to assert his total dominance over Iraq, this struggle led to the defeat of the PMF, the Fatah Coalition, and other Shiite factions in the elections. Their primary concern was losing their political and economic influence. For example, the “special grades” program, which allows political parties to control the hiring of state officials, would no longer benefit the Fatah Alliance, thus impacting their control over government business dealings. In addition, the PMF’s budget could be reduced; even worse, the group could lose its special status and be integrated into the government payroll. Any Sadr-led reform initiative would necessitate the repression of the PMF’s lucrative illicit economic activities. While some outside observers may accept a Sadr reform agenda at face value, the PMF and its leaders and patrons (both in Baghdad and Tehran) would view it more cynically as the targeted actions of a former rival bent on settling political scores and seizing power.
Sadr has played a significant role in highlighting how the PMF, particularly the Iran-allied militias within it, has evolved from what was once a likely national force into a powerful entity with extensive influence in both the political and economic spheres of Iraq. Despite its unpopularity, the PMF’s power shows little sign of waning, largely due to its use of force with impunity to sustain its dominance and silence opposition. PMF leaders have consistently asserted their uncontested autonomy. This situation suggests that as the PMF’s political influence wanes, it may increasingly resort to oppressive measures to preserve its power and control.