In the wake of the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, Iraq was left in a state of total disarray. Institutions across the country, from the military to the security and service sectors, were dissolved overnight, leaving the country grappling with chaos and anarchy. This sudden vacuum created fertile ground for foreign powers and local political forces to vie for control. Among the most pivotal moments in this post-invasion period was the drafting of the Iraqi constitution — a document that would shape the future of the country. But what was supposed to be a cornerstone for democracy and national unity became a blueprint for sectarian division, foreign intervention, and institutional dysfunction.
The drafting of Iraq’s new constitution began under the supervision of Paul Bremer, the American administrator in charge of Iraq after the invasion. In an effort to patch the ever-widening cracks of post-Saddam chaos, Bremer sought to establish a new legal framework for the country. The American government, led by President George W. Bush, made it clear that the U.S. military’s withdrawal from Iraq was contingent upon the drafting of a new constitution, the establishment of Iraqi institutions, and the construction of a functioning infrastructure. It was an ambitious project, but one fraught with complexities that would ultimately shape the future of the Iraqi state.
At the center of this constitutional process stood Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, whose influence over Iraq’s Shiite majority made him an indispensable player in the negotiation process. While Bremer and the Americans sought to ensure that the constitution would safeguard their interests in Iraq, al-Sistani and his Iranian backers viewed the document as a way to cement their own political and religious control over the country.
Iran’s interests were unmistakable. Tehran sought to ensure that Iraq would not slip into the hands of hostile forces and that the country would remain a sphere of influence under the control of Iran and its Shiite allies. The Iranian leadership wasted no time in pushing for a constitution that would grant more autonomy to the Shiite regions of Iraq, a strategy that, over time, would serve to fragment the country along sectarian lines. As the Americans and their Iraqi counterparts worked toward finalizing the document, Iran quietly moved to shape the process, with al-Sistani’s religious authority serving as a conduit for Tehran’s influence.
This behind-the-scenes struggle for control led to a series of compromises, and the eventual agreement on a “consensus” constitution. This was, in reality, a document that attempted to balance the competing interests of Shiites, Kurds, and Sunni Arabs, each of whom had different visions for the future of Iraq. The Kurdish bloc, led by the powerful families of Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani, sought a federal system that would grant them greater autonomy in the north, while the Shiite majority, backed by Iran, advocated for decentralization to prevent a return to centralized, authoritarian rule. The Sunni Arabs, who had lost power with the fall of Saddam, pushed for a more unified state, fearing that decentralization would lead to the disintegration of the country and the rise of sectarian violence.
The final result was a constitution that enshrined the concept of “components” — a formalized recognition of Iraq’s various ethnic and sectarian groups. While this may have seemed like a concession to diversity, it instead created a framework for sectarian power-sharing that exacerbated existing divisions within the country. Rather than fostering national unity, the constitution laid the groundwork for a political system that would reward sectarian identity over national loyalty.
One of the most contentious elements of the process was the representation of Sunni Arabs in the constitutional drafting committee. With only two Sunni members in a committee dominated by Shiites and Kurds, many in the Sunni community felt sidelined. The exclusion was not merely symbolic; it reflected a broader sense of alienation felt by Iraq’s Sunni Arabs, whose concerns about the constitution were often dismissed by the dominant political factions. The Sunni community’s discontent was so palpable that it led to the assassination of two Sunni members of the drafting committee, Dr. Dhiman Hussein al-Abidi and Dr. Majbal Sheikh Issa, in what was widely seen as a deliberate effort to further marginalize them. In response, the National Dialogue Council of Iraq, a Sunni political body, suspended its participation in the drafting process.
The final constitution, ratified in 2005, enshrined several controversial provisions. One such provision was the recognition of Iraq’s identity within the Arab world, which was amended after significant opposition from both Sunni Iraqis and Arab countries. Additionally, the constitution’s emphasis on regional autonomy and federalism paved the way for the creation of a Kurdish semi-autonomous region and, eventually, a push for greater Shiite control in southern Iraq. The central government in Baghdad, weak and fragmented, struggled to assert authority over these autonomous regions, resulting in a political system riddled with dysfunction and corruption.
While the constitution laid out the framework for a federal Iraq, it also introduced new challenges. Iran’s influence was embedded in the text, with provisions that seemed to favor Shiite interests at the expense of Sunni and Kurdish concerns. The question of water rights, for instance, became a flashpoint, as Iran began to divert rivers that once flowed into Iraq, exacerbating tensions over resources and contributing to the displacement of millions of Iraqis. These policies, along with others shaped by Iranian interests, have caused immense hardship for Iraq’s citizens, particularly in the south.
The accusations of corruption in the drafting process only added to the controversy surrounding the constitution. In 2005, former Iraqi Interior Minister Baqir Jabr al-Zubaidi ignited a political storm when he revealed that members of the constitutional drafting committee had received bribes of $150,000 each from foreign entities. This revelation, made in a televised interview, cast further doubt on the legitimacy of the constitution and its ability to serve the interests of the Iraqi people.
Moreover, the constitution’s weak implementation has left many provisions unfulfilled. More than 50 articles, some critical to Iraq’s governance, remain without accompanying laws. The political elites, many of whom were more concerned with securing their own power than with strengthening the state, failed to ensure that the legal framework would actually function in practice. As a result, Iraq’s constitution became more of a symbolic document than a practical guide for governance.
Looking back at the process that led to the drafting of Iraq’s constitution, it is clear that it was shaped by both foreign and domestic political forces that were more concerned with carving out their own spheres of influence than with building a unified, stable Iraq. Rather than establishing a solid foundation for democratic governance, the constitution entrenched divisions, created a fragile political system, and opened the door for corruption and foreign manipulation.
Today, the country is still grappling with the consequences of this flawed document. The deep divisions it fostered between Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic groups have only grown more entrenched, and the challenges of governance remain as daunting as ever. As Iraq faces an uncertain future, the question remains: will the Iraqi constitution ever be revised to reflect the needs and aspirations of the people, or will it continue to serve as a tool for those who seek to exploit the country’s resources for their own benefit?